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Although now over 25 years old, many of the essays are quite contemporary. As 
expected, none of the authors grasp the full relevance of W for the description of 
behavior, missing most of the points made in my comments above, his many 
examples of how S1 becomes S2, his role as a pioneer in EP, and his attempts to 
separate nature from nurture. Brose has many good points and is aware of the 
foundational nature of On Certainty, but is too scattered and does not clearly 
describe W’s analysis of how our innate automatic unconscious S1 is the axiomatic 
basis for all behavior (but with a few exceptions nobody else to this day has either). 
Russell’s article is excellent, especially the first part dealing with Kripke’s famously 
distorted view of W. For a more recent and superb deconstruction of Kripke’s W 
that is of very general application, see ‘Kripke’s conjuring Trick’ by Read and 
Sharrock. 
I also found Coulter’s article quite good, and like Margolis and Harre, he has 
continued his work to the present day and published widely. Margolis is very bright 
and well-read but his precious prose and attempt to include as many references as 
possible results in a lack of clarity and focus. Rosch makes the best effort to apply 
W to real research but also lacks the broad understanding of him that could 
transform his view of higher order thought. Harre has since become a major W 
scholar but has little to say here, so those interested should see my review of his 
‘Wittgenstein and Psychology’. Overall, considering that this book was written over 
25 years ago, and most of the authors were not philosophers, they did a good job 
and the volume is still worth reading. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
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Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
"young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For 
in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the 
other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems 
that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI 
p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor 
do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false. "Wittgenstein OC 
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"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a 
defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no 
real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
 
“The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from 
this can more complicated forms develop. Language--I want to say--is a refinement. 
‘In the beginning was the deed.’” CV p31 
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“Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ meant-so 
that he constantly called different things by that name-but nevertheless used the 
word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of the word 
‘pain’-in short he used it as we all do.” PI p271 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. Is is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) 
what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a 
reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to 
make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no 
act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that 
“something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion 
between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain 
of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and 
reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The 
sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it 
represents.” BBB p37 
 
“Thus we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are obviously 
not aware of the many different usages of the word “proof; and that they are not 
clear about the differences between the uses of the word “kind”, when they talk of 
kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word “kind” here meant the same 
thing as in the context “kinds of apples.” Or, we may say, they are not aware of the 
different meanings of the word “discovery” when in one case we talk of the 
discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the other case of the discovery 
of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
4 
 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 
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“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems of life remain completely untouched.  Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 
 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
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remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions.”  PI 126 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, 
that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the 
matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have got it actually 
present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the realm of the 
grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already there. Thus, we 
have already got everything and need not wait for the future.” (said in 1930) 
Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything.---Not anything that 
follows from this, no this itself is the solution!….This is connected, I believe, with 
our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a 
description, if we give it the right place in our considerations.  If we dwell upon it, 
and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
“For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply 
means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” PI p133 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) 
are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive 
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psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy 
is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (HOT), which is another of 
the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated 
anywhere. 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: “Wittgenstein 
resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, 
sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems about the nature of 
linguistic representation, about the relationship between thought and language, 
about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and 
about the nature of necessary truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed 
up the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and 
immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted 
to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical 
truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a 
vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual 
confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late 
interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively describe 
the two systems of thought (most clearly in his last work On Certainty) -- fast 
automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective linguistic dispositional S2, though 
of course he did not use this terminology, referring to the intransitive and transitive 
modes. He explained how behavior only is possible with a vast inherited 
background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be doubted or judged, 
so will (choice), consciousness, self, time and space are innate true-only axioms. He 
discussed many times what is now known as Theory of Mind, Framing and 
cognitive illusions. He frequently explained the necessity of the innate background 
and demonstrated how it generates behavior. He described the psychology behind 
what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure used in EP research 
decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature of language and the game-like 
nature of social interaction. He examined in thousands of pages and hundreds of 
examples how our inner mental experiences are not describable in language, this 
being possible only for public behavior with a public language (the impossibility of 
private language). Thus, he can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist. 
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When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of intuitive 
psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the 
nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world and like 
Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual 
recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early version of his 
ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world famous; completely 
changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge 
of his new work, in mostly garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures 
and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly 
handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs 
with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that he wrote in a 
Socratic style with 3 distinct persons in the dialog—the narrator, the interlocutor 
and the commentator (usually W’s view) whose comments were blended together 
by most readers, thus completely vitiating the whole elucidatory and therapeutic 
thrust, that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier 
with notes in the margins, underlinings and crossed out words, so that many 
sentences have multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this indigestible 
mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous 
task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly 
novel views of how the universe works and that they then published this material 
with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that 
contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he became as much 
notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake 
and even nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of 
hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many 
physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive summation 
of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and condensed form that it 
was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and 
that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of 
modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous references to him, and that 
many omitted him entirely; that to this day, over half a century after his death, there 
were only a handful of people who really grasped the monumental consequences 
of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Before remarking on “Meaning and the Growth of Understanding” (MGU), I will 
first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
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psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), 
Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New 
Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and 
about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior not 
found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. A major theme 
in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically 
programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order 
behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., 
perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into 
culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher 
order S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional 
thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, prelinguistic mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 -
-Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can 
be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and 
Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only 
be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 
2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, 
S, Hacker etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they were originally called  Causally 
Self Referential but later Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) by Searle -called reflexive or 
intransitive in BBB), and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which 
can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., 
they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR (called transitive in 
BBB). 
 
9 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of 
perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear 
numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-
only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often 
modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that 
often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by 
Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that 
this view is not credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public 
truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there 
aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the 
thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). 
Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment 
meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and 
reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note here 
that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent 
warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a 
characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can 
find. 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... 
is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which 
means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that 
can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. 
 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not 
have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments 
that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what 
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gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. 
Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should 
happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled 
cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean 
that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have 
learned to talk, then I do know." 
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. He 
shows that behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms (see “On Certainty” 
for his final extended treatment of this idea) and that our conscious ratiocination 
emerges from unconscious machinations. His corpus can be seen as the foundation 
for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed 
must work. The “must” is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common 
ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this 
necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same 
evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended 
into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to 
manipulate others. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider W’s work 
and most of his examples as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking 
(e.g., perceptions vs dispositions-- see below), but nature and nurture. 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the Top 
Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of examples of 
language use in context, exposing the many varieties of language games and the 
relationships between the primary games of true-only unconscious, axiomatic fast 
thinking of perception, memory and reflexive emotions and acts (often described as 
the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-self functions), and the 
later evolved higher cortical dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, 
thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language 
games of slow thinking that include the network of cognitive illusions that 
constitute the basis of our second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of 
language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive 
actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also 
address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his 
later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current 
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and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that 
this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s 
famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of 
evolutionary psychology.” 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature”) that language is a window on or some 
sort of translation of our thinking  or even (Fodor) that there must be some other 
“Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried 
to show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of 
language in action, that language is not just the best picture we can ever get of 
thinking, the mind and human nature, but speech is the mind, and his whole corpus 
can be regarded as the development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the 
Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology and computation 
(Computational Theory of Mind, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, 
functionalism, etc.) could reveal what his analyses of Language Games (LG’s) did. 
The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and 
to capture vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way 
of representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347). 
 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that 
the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front 
of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon the myth of 
introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to 
observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is 
essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, 
points out). 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP 
and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A corollary, 
nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is 
that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other 
nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the 
result of involuntary axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
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The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like 
“cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course 
these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways to use 
these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever of 
slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of 
“cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, 
“cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
One of W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UA (Understanding of 
Agency). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 and UA2 in experiments, has 
recently become aware of Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no 
‘Theory’ nor representation involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2—see my 
review of his book with Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no 
idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible view that 
the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher 
order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite 
of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ 
of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything 
approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly 
there is barely a mention. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in 
the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 
3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing 
behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have 
seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three 
dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, 
between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly 
different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by 
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scientists but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as 
opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful 
in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), 
the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality 
(LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical 
philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
I give a detailed explanation of the table in my other writings. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and 
each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of 
context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which 
provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their 
analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
Now for some comments on MGU. 
 
After the above and my many reviews of books by and about W, S, H etc., it should 
be clear what W is doing so I’ll make just a few comments. 
 
Although now over 25 years old, many of the essays are quite contemporary. As 
expected, none of the authors grasp the full relevance of W for the description of 
behavior, missing most of the points made in my comments above, his many 
examples of how S1becomes S2, his role as a pioneer in EP, and his attempts to 
separate nature from nurture. Brose has many good points and is aware of the 
foundational nature of On Certainty, but is too scattered and does not clearly 
describe W’s analysis of how our innate automatic unconscious S1 is the axiomatic 
basis for all behavior (but with a few exceptions nobody else to this day has either). 
Russell’s article is excellent, especially the first part dealing with Kripke’s famously 
distorted view of W. For a more recent and superb deconstruction of Kripke’s W 
that is of very general application, see “Kripke’s conjuring Trick” by Read and 
Sharrock, available on the net. 
 
I also found Coulter’s article quite good and like Margolis and Harre, he has 
continued his work to the present day and published widely. Margolis is very bright 
and well-read but his precious prose and attempt to include as many references as 
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possible results in a lack of clarity and focus. Rosch makes the best effort to apply 
W to real research but also lacks the broad understanding of him that could 
transform the view of higher order thought. Harre has since become a major W 
scholar but has little to say here, so those interested should see my review of his 
“Wittgenstein and Psychology”. Overall, considering that this book was written 
over 25 years ago and most of the authors were not philosophers they did a good 
job and the volume is still worth reading. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to 
miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
